Theory of Mind Profiles in Children With Autism Spectrum Disorder: Adaptive/Social Skills and Pragmatic Competence by Roselló, Belén et al.
fpsyg-11-567401 September 16, 2020 Time: 13:55 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH








University of Turin, Italy
Gabriella Airenti,





This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 29 May 2020
Accepted: 20 August 2020
Published: 17 September 2020
Citation:
Rosello B, Berenguer C, Baixauli I,
García R and Miranda A (2020)
Theory of Mind Profiles in Children
With Autism Spectrum Disorder:




Theory of Mind Profiles in Children
With Autism Spectrum Disorder:
Adaptive/Social Skills and Pragmatic
Competence
Belen Rosello1, Carmen Berenguer1* , Inmaculada Baixauli2, Rosa García3 and
Ana Miranda1
1 Developmental and Educational Psychology, University of Valencia, Valencia, Spain, 2 Occupational Sciences, Speech
Language Therapy, Developmental and Educational Psychology Department, Catholic University of Valencia, Valencia,
Spain, 3 Developmental, Social, Educational Psychology and Methodology, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón de la Plana,
Spain
Theory of Mind (ToM) is one of the most relevant concepts in the field of social cognition,
particularly in the case of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Literature showing that
individuals with ASD display deficits in ToM is extensive and robust. However, some
related issues deserve more research: the heterogeneous profile of ToM abilities in
children with ASD and the association between different levels of ToM development
and social, pragmatic, and adaptive behaviors in everyday life. The first objective of this
study was to identify profiles of children with ASD without intellectual disability (ID), based
on explicit and applied ToM knowledge, and compare these profiles with a group of
children with typical development (TD). A second objective was to determine differences
in symptom severity, adaptive/social behavior, and pragmatic abilities between the
profiles identified. Fifty-two children with a clinical diagnosis of ASD without ID and
37 children with TD performed neuropsychological ToM tasks and two vocabulary
and memory tests. In addition, all of their mothers completed different questionnaires
about applied ToM abilities, severity of ASD symptoms, adaptive/social skills, and
pragmatic competence. Two subgroups were identified in the cluster analysis carried
out with explicit and applied ToM indicators. The “Lower ToM abilities” profile obtained
significantly lower scores than the “Higher ToM abilities” profile on all the ToM measures.
Furthermore, the analysis of covariance, controlling for vocabulary and working memory
(ANCOVAs), showed statistically significant differences in applied ToM abilities between
the two groups of children with ASD without ID and the group with TD. However, only the
group with “Higher ToM abilities” achieved similar performance to the TD group on the
verbal task of explicit ToM knowledge. Finally, the “Lower ToM abilities” cluster obtained
significantly higher scores on autism symptoms (social and communication domains)
and lower scores on adaptive behavior and pragmatic skills than the cluster with “Higher
ToM abilities.” Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding the
heterogeneity in ToM skills in children with ASD without ID, and their differential impact
on social, communicative, and adaptive behaviors.
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INTRODUCTION
The Theory of Mind (ToM) is a broad, complex, and multifaceted
construct, defined as the ability to attribute mental states (beliefs,
desires, intentions) to oneself and to others, making it possible
to explain and predict behavior (Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
For decades, authors have argued that ToM deficits are prevalent
in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985),
a neurodevelopmental condition characterized by persistent
communication and social interaction difficulties, restricted
interests, and the presence of repetitive behaviors (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Robust empirical findings confirm
these ToM impairments in ASD (Kimhi, 2014), based on inferior
performance on assessment tasks.
Autism Spectrum Disorders has a very heterogeneous range
of symptoms with varying degrees of severity. Similarly,
performance on tests assessing ToM skills is not uniform either.
A key factor influencing this variability has to do with the ToM
component being assessed and the type of task used for this
purpose. Research currently supports the subdivision of ToM
into implicit and explicit components that describe different
aspects of social stimulus processing (Frith and Frith, 2012).
On the one hand, explicit ToM skills refer to a conceptual,
logical, and controlled ToM knowledge, which is distinguished
by sequential and conscious processing (Satpute and Liberman,
2006; Frith and Frith, 2012). Tasks with clear instructions such as
classic first- and second-order false beliefs would be paradigmatic
examples of procedures for evaluating this explicit component.
On the other hand, the implicit component of the ToM acts
quickly, spontaneously, and unconsciously. It allows the correct
anticipation of behavior without a deliberate reflection on the
mental state of the other. In this regard, the tasks involving
the categorization of facial expressions according to the emotion
expressed are methods for evaluating implicit competence.
Explicit and Applied Theory of Mind in
ASD
In general, research has found that people with ASD without
intellectual disabilities (ID) tend to perform better on explicit
ToM tasks (Happé, 1995; Senju, 2012, 2013). This has been
demonstrated through the use of standard first- and second-
order false belief tests (Dahlgren and Trillingsgaard, 1996; Baron-
Cohen, 2001; Cantio et al., 2018), and even with complex,
advanced-level tasks (e.g., Director Task), where adolescents with
ASD have been found to perform on par with the typically
developing (TD) group (Barendse et al., 2018). In contrast,
performance was significantly lower on tasks of an implicit
nature, such as those based on facial emotion perception and
categorization without the aid of contextual cues (Harms et al.,
2010; Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013; Lozier et al., 2014; Schaller
and Rauh, 2017), free verbal judgments about social situations
(Callenmark et al., 2014), or gaze patterns, assessed by eye-
tracking, which reflect spontaneous attributions of false beliefs
(Zhou et al., 2019).
A question that has been widely discussed in research is
whether, regardless of the type of task and the ToM component
assessed, there is a clear discrepancy between the performance
of people with ASD on ‘laboratory’ measurements and their
application of ToM in natural everyday environments (Senju
et al., 2009; Scheeren et al., 2013). Hutchins et al. (2016, p. 98)
defined applied ToM as “the ability to deploy ToM knowledge to
successfully address ToM dilemmas as they are presented in real-
world samples of behavior.” It has been observed, for example,
that people with ASD can succeed on false belief tasks, but they
fail when they have to act spontaneously based on this knowledge,
i.e., when they have to demonstrate applied ToM (Senju, 2012;
Livingston and Happé, 2017).
There could be several reasons for this discrepancy in the
results. Undoubtedly, real-life situations are more complex and
dynamic in terms of information processing. As Hutchins et al.
(2016, p. 98) highlighted, “applied ToM competence is ostensibly
affected by a variety of endogenous (e.g., executive functioning,
motivation, and sensitivity) and exogenous (e.g., physical setting)
factors.” Clearly, during everyday social interactions, people with
ASD are exposed to a continuous stream of ToM challenges
with varying demands. The social cues are more unpredictable
and ambiguous, and they take place under time pressure with
limited information and cognitive resources. The large number
of verbal and non-verbal contextual cues make them difficult
to process automatically, causing congestion that acts as a
bottleneck in the processing of social stimuli. This problem is
compounded by social patterns that have not been adequately
developed (Schaller and Rauh, 2017). These difficulties with
applied ToM are consistent with findings showing that training
in the attribution of mental states in formal situations does
not necessarily guarantee better social adaptation of people
with ASD (Begeer et al., 2011; Senju, 2013). For this reason,
procedures for the assessment of mental skills have been
designed with greater ecological validity, attempting to capture
the application of ToM to the real world in everyday life.
Questionnaires such as the “Theory of Mind Inventory” (ToMI)
(Hutchins et al., 2011) have made it possible to identify
disorders in children with ASD with larger effect sizes than those
obtained from the administration of explicit proficiency tests
(Berenguer et al., 2018).
Another reason for the inconsistent findings may be the use
of measures that have been designed to assess a broad spectrum
of ToM skills, ranging from understanding basic mental states
to skills at a more advanced level of development (Steele
et al., 2003). The controlled condition where the assessment is
conducted would also influence the results. Thus, the use of
simple structured tasks with explicit instructions and limited
options decreases the social cognition demands, which would
favor successful results. Other possible sources of variability
in ToM results in ASD would be cognitive ability, given that
ToM is a meta-representational skill dependent on general
domain cognitive skills (Pellicano, 2010; Pruett et al., 2015),
or even other deficient processes in ASD, such as executive
functions (Miranda et al., 2017; Demetriou et al., 2018). It
has also been documented that ToM task performance is
closely related to language skills, particularly receptive vocabulary
and complementation syntax (Tager-Flusberg, 2001). Language
proficiency would act as a compensatory mechanism to facilitate
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task achievement, but it would not imply the mastery of
genuine and mature ToM.
ToM and Adaptive/Social Skills
In general, ToM skills, the ability to share feelings, exchange
ideas, and anticipate others’ behavior, are essential for social
life (Zhou et al., 2019). Successful social functioning requires
an understanding of other people’s emotions, intentions, beliefs,
and knowledge. However, although deficits in mind-reading
skills may reasonably explain, at least in part, the social
difficulties experienced by people with ASD, research findings
are inconsistent.
Pioneering studies such as the one by Fombonne et al. (1994)
sought precisely to describe the associations between adaptive
social skills, assessed by parental reports on a subset of items
from the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow et al.,
1984), and performance on false belief tasks. Specifically, in the
study by Fombonne et al. (1994), participants who succeeded
in overcoming social cognition tasks were older, showed higher
intellectual ability, and performed better on social and adaptive
behaviors involving understanding minds. However, when their
verbal ability was taken into account, these specific differences
were no longer significant.
Later, other studies using measures of social understanding
(false belief understanding, affective perspective-taking) and
measures of social responsiveness and social interaction (level of
engagement with peers on the playground and prosocial behavior
in a structured laboratory task) found that, in children with
autism, initiating joint attention and empathy were strongly
related to both measures of social interaction competence (Travis
et al., 2001). Similar results were obtained when using teachers’
ratings of peer interaction skills, which showed a significant
correlation with the scores obtained on false belief tasks by
children with ASD (Peterson et al., 2007).
To the same end, Tager-Flusberg (2001) applied a battery of
various ToM tasks (including symbolic play, moral judgment,
and false belief) to a large sample of participants with ASD,
and they found a significant association between ToM skills and
social competence, again assessed with the Vineland social scale
(Sparrow et al., 1984). More recently, Bishop-Fitzpatrick et al.
(2017), in a cross-sectional study, showed that better performance
on second-order false belief tasks was associated with better
socio-adaptive behavior and fewer social problems. Mazza et al.
(2017), using mediation analysis, warned that ToM plays a key
role in the development of social skills, and that the lack of ToM
competence in children with autism alters their competent social
behavior. Thus, they concluded that the ability to understand
emotions and beliefs is necessary in order to display appropriate
social behavior. Finally, Altschuler et al. (2018) reported a positive
relationship between affective ToM (ability to infer other people’s
emotions) and social symptoms characteristic of ASD. In other
words, affective ToM predicted the severity of social symptoms,
but not social functioning in a broad sense. In the same study, no
type or level of ToM (basic or advanced) was able to predict the
social behavior described by the parents.
Not all research has identified this positive association between
ToM and social competence. For example, Prior et al. (1990)
could not find a relationship between performance on false
belief tasks and caregivers’ estimates of the social skills of their
children with autism. Similarly, although in Joseph and Tager-
Flusberg’s (2004) study, ToM and executive functions could
explain significant variance on the Communication section of
the ADOS-G (Lord et al., 2000), this effect did not occur in
the Social Interaction section. That is, the executive functions
and the ToM were more strongly associated with communicative
functioning than with social functioning. Moreover, it has been
possible to identify a subgroup or profile of individuals with
ASD who, in spite of manifesting continuous difficulties in
understanding the mind of the other, exhibited few social
affectation symptoms (Livingston et al., 2019). This subgroup,
called “high compensators,” presented characteristics such as a
higher verbal intelligence quotient (IQ) and better executive
functioning skills, among other features.
In addition, in longitudinal studies like the one by Bennett
et al. (2013), although language, non-verbal IQ, and ToM
predicted a relatively small but significant amount of variance
in adaptive functioning, ToM was not uniquely predictive of
variance in adaptive socialization in early adolescence after
controlling for IQ. Nor was this predictive power of ToM found
in the study by Peterson et al. (2016), who noticed that neither
language ability nor ToM directly predicted peer social skills.
The inconsistency in the results seems to indicate that ToM
is necessary but not sufficient to explain social competence.
Therefore, an attempt has been made to identify other factors
that, along with ToM skills, can better justify social functioning
deficits in ASD. Thus, studies have shown that ToM competence
combined with pragmatic language skills can predict and directly
and indirectly influence the socialization of children with ASD
without intellectual disabilities (Berenguer et al., 2018). These
relationships are to be expected, given the profile of vulnerability
that children with ASD present in the pragmatic area, a universal
deficit in the disorder (Lam, 2014).
ToM and Pragmatic Ability in ASD
Theory of Mind and the pragmatic dimension of language
are closely intertwined, and several findings from different
approaches support this relationship. From a developmental
perspective, it has been raised that ToM and pragmatics are
co-evolved functions (Westra and Carruthers, 2017). From a
psycholinguistic framework, no account can be given of key
pragmatic notions like indirect speech acts, deictic expressions,
presuppositions, pronoun reference or irony, in the absence
of the involvement of ToM (Cummings, 2013). Finally, from
a neurobiological point of view, a significant overlap has
been found between the neural basis of ToM and that of
narrative comprehension (Mar, 2011), which is directly related
to pragmatic skill (Botting, 2002). All these arguments have led
to conclude that “ToM and pragmatic aspects of language are so
fused that they cannot be separable” (Kobayashi, 2018, p. 118).
In this regard, O’Neill (2012) established a pragmatic taxonomy
in which “mindful pragmatics” was considered, that is, the uses
of language that require adopting the perspective of the listener,
such as engaging in a conversation or elaborating a speech.
In both situations, the information needs of the receiver must
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be monitored and adapted to his/her perspective. Ultimately,
the correct interpretation of the intentions and beliefs of the
interlocutor in relation to the context is absolutely essential for
good development of pragmatic communication.
Although still scarce, most studies on the subject demonstrate
a significant association between mind-reading skills and
pragmatic competence. Thus, correlations have been found in
children with autism – but not in children with developmental
delay – between performance on ToM tasks and the ability
to respond to a conversational partner with new, relevant,
and contingent information (Capps et al., 1998). The same
significant association has been found between understanding
of first-order false belief tasks and various narrative properties,
such as the use of evaluative statements (Capps et al., 2000)
and referential cohesion (Kuijper et al., 2015). Specifically, in
relation to discourse, longitudinal studies have found that ToM
contributed unique variance in discourse skills beyond the
contribution of language competence (Hale and Tager-Flusberg,
2005). Furthermore, a mediating role of ToM has been identified
in the association between language ability at the age of 6–8 years
and adaptive communication measured 6 years later, which
suggests that “structural language (grammar and vocabulary),
ToM and later adaptive communication are related over the
course of development in children with ASD” (Bennett et al.,
2013, p. 17).
Symptom Severity and ToM
Research has shown an association between greater ToM deficits
and ASD symptom severity in terms of social communication
difficulties and restricted and repetitive behaviors. A study
by Shimoni et al. (2012) found that clinical assessment of
autistic symptoms in children with Asperger Syndrome/High
Functioning Autism was negatively correlated with ToM
measures, obtained through The Social Attribution task (SAT)
(Klin, 2000). Statistically significant correlations were found for
the Pertinence and Salience indices, and for measures of the ADI-
R (Rutter et al., 2006). In other words, more autistic symptoms
were related to more non-pertinent propositions and fewer social
elements identified.
Subsequently, Hoogenhout and Malcolm-Smith (2017), using
hierarchical cluster analysis, determined that ToM skills were
capable of reliably discriminating ASD severity levels, and the
three clusters they identified (severe, moderate, and mild ASD)
were strongly associated with the level of support required,
as indicated by the type of school environment. These results
agree with those reported by Aljunied and Frederikson (2011),
who found that a ToM index, combined with IQ measures,
contributed significantly to the categorization of children with
ASD in three types of educational support. Particularly, for
children with less severe needs, those who did not need any
additional support were differentiated from those who did
by ToM measures.
Finally, using structural equation modeling, and accounting
for ToM and executive functions (EF) in one model, Jones
et al. (2018) established that mind-reading difficulties were
associated with more severe social communication symptoms
and restrictive and repetitive behaviors, in adolescents with
ASD. It is noteworthy that the strength of associations between
social communication and ToM and between restrictive and
repetitive behaviors and ToM were similar. This last finding
contrasts with the results of other studies that did not find any
significant correlation between ToM and restrictive and repetitive
behaviors (Joseph and Tager-Flusberg, 2004; Cantio et al., 2016).
These inconsistencies are explained according to the procedure
used to evaluate the behavior symptomatology, mainly through
observation or parent-interview. In contrast, Jones et al. (2018)
used a targeted questionnaire designed to gather information
about the breath of restricted and repetitive behaviors observed
in ASD. It is concluded that “a bewildering social world due
to impoverished mentalizing abilities could lead to that kind of
behaviors that lessen anxiety and reduce confusion” (Jones et al.,
2018, p. 103). Consequently, impairments in understanding the
social world could promote the emergence of idiosyncratic and
unusually intense interests and repetitive behaviors.
In summary, ToM is a complex construct that has not been
used consistently in research, which has led to considerable
variability in the evaluation tasks and mixed literature results.
It is likely that the divergent results at least partly depend
on the assessment demands and the cognitive level of the
individuals being assessed. Therefore, measures of explicit ToM
competence and applied ToM competence, along with different
levels of ToM skills and cognitive levels, should be taken
into account to identify more homogeneous profiles. A cluster
analysis may be an appropriate methodology to establish different
profiles of mind-reading skills within ASD when attempting
to analyze the relationships between ToM and other common
difficulties in this disorder, such as pragmatic difficulties or social
adjustment problems.
Consequently, the first objective of this study was to identify
profiles of children with ASD without intellectual disability (ID),
based on explicit and applied ToM knowledge, comparing these
profiles with a group of children with typical development (TD).
We hypothesize that the profiles identified in children with ASD
will differ on ToM skills of different types (explicit and applied),
and that these children, even the best performing profile, will
have a lower level of development than the TD group. A second
objective was to examine differences in ASD symptom severity,
social and adaptive behavior, and pragmatic abilities among the
identified profiles. We expect that, based on the central role
of ToM deficits in ASD, the profile with lower ToM abilities




This study included 52 children with ASD without intellectual
disability (ID) and 37 children with typical development (TD).
The two groups of children were between 7 and 11 years old, and
they had an intellectual functioning within the limits of normality
on the K-BIT (Kaufman and Kaufman, 2000).
The group of children with ASD had received a clinical
diagnosis of an autism spectrum condition in hospitals and
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medical centers by Psychiatry and Child Neurology services in
the Valencian community at ages ranging between 2 years and
11 months and 6 years old. According to the protocol for the
ASD diagnosis, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders criteria for ASD from the fourth edition (DSM-IV;
American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the Autistic Diagnostic
Interview—Revised (ADI-R; Rutter et al., 2006), and/or the
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule-WPS (ADOS-WPS;
Lord et al., 1999) were administered by a multidisciplinary
team. In order to confirm the ASD diagnosis for the present
study, the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter
et al., 2003) and the Autism Diagnostic Interview-revised (ADI-
R; Rutter et al., 2006) were administered, taking into account
the recommended cut-off points. These two instruments were
administered to the parents by a clinical psychologist from the
research team who had been accredited in their application.
Likewise, all the children met the strict diagnostic criteria for ASD
from the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association,
2013), based on information reported by teachers and parents.
Both informants, through interviews with a clinical psychologist,
rated the severity of the criteria in the two ASD dimensions on
scales ranging from 0 to 3 points (0 represents “almost never,” 1
“sometimes,” 2 “often,” and 3 “many times”).
Regarding the school modality, three children with ASD
(5.8%) were attending school in regular classrooms full time
without educational support; 29 children (55.7%) attended
regular classrooms but received educational support for their
specific needs in the school; and finally, 20 children (38.5%) were
placed in the Communication and Language classroom modality.
In other words, according to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013), the support required by the participants
corresponded to level 1 severity. Furthermore, 32.7% of the
children with ASD were taking antipsychotic medication (mostly
risperidone) for behavioral problems and irritability symptoms.
The typically developing children were in the same schools
as the clinical sample in the study. They had no history of
psychopathology or referral to pediatric mental health units
(USMI), according to the information found in the school
records, and they did not meet DSM-5 criteria for ASD on the
screening carried out before beginning the evaluation. None of
them was taking any psychoactive medication.
The exclusion criteria for the children who participated in
this study were evaluated through an extensive anamnesis carried
out with the families. They included neurological or genetic
diseases, brain lesions, sensory, auditory, or motor deficits,
and an IQ below 80.
Both groups of children, with ASD and with TD, were matched
on age [t(89) = −0.15, p = 0.88], IQ [t(89) = −0.28, p = 0.78], and
their level on a Vocabulary subtest from the WISC-IV (Wechsler,
2003) [t(89) = −1.04, p = 0.30].
Measures
The selection of the measures used was primarily based on the
following criteria: utility and relevance according to the objectives
of this study, translation and adaptation to Spanish and good
psychometric properties.
Explicit and Applied ToM Knowledge
The subtests of Affect Recognition and Theory of Mind, which
are included in the Social Perception domain of the NEPSY–
II (A Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment Battery,
Korkman et al., 2007), were administered to all the children to
assess their explicit ToM knowledge. The first subtest, Affect
Recognition (AR), aims to evaluate the ability to identify
emotions (happy, sad, anger, fear, disgust, and neutral emotion)
through photographs of children’s faces. The second subtest,
Theory of Mind, contains two parts. The first part (verbal task)
includes 15 items that assess the subject’s ability to understand
beliefs, intentions, thoughts, and feelings that are different from
their own. The child is read various scenarios or shown pictures,
and s/he is then asked to correctly answer questions that require
knowledge about another individual’s point of view. The second
part (contextual task) includes 5 items that assess the subject’s
ability to put him/herself in the place of one of the characters
and think about what s/he is feeling in a situation represented
in a drawing. The child is shown a picture depicting a social
context and asked to select one photograph from four options
that depicts the appropriate affect of one of the people in the
picture. Higher scores on both Nepsy-II tests indicate greater
development of theory of mind skills. Many studies have reported
reliability data for all the scales, and there is also evidence
of convergent and discriminant validity of the NEPSY battery
(Korkman et al., 2007).
To evaluate the application of ToM skills, the parents
completed the Theory of Mind Inventory (ToMI; Hutchins et al.,
2014; Spanish adaptation by Pujals et al., 2016). It comprises
42 items distributed in three scales, and each item is scored
from 0 to 20 points, with 5 response alternatives ranging from
“definitely not” to “definitely.” The early subscale assesses skills
for understanding basic emotions. The basic subscale includes
understanding mental terms and the distinction between physical
and mental representations. Finally, the advanced subscale, which
was used in this study, assesses second-order beliefs (i.e., “My
child understands that people can be wrong about what other
people want”) and competence in understanding inferences
and complex social judgments (i.e., “My child understands the
difference between a friend teasing in a nice way and a bully
making fun of someone in a mean way”). High scores indicate
good perception in the development of theory of mind skills. The
ToMI has adequate validity, good internal consistency, and test-
retest reliability. It has also shown excellent sensitivity (0.90) and
specificity (0.90) (Hutchins et al., 2011; Pujals et al., 2016).
Psychological and Behavioral Adjustment
The SDQ questionnaire (SDQ-Cas-Goodman, 1997; adapted
to Spanish by Rodríguez-Hernández et al., 2012) was filled
out by the parents to assess a broad range of mental
health symptoms. It contains a total of 25 items grouped
in five subscales (emotional symptoms, behavioral problems,
hyperactivity/attention problems, peer relationship problems,
and prosocial behavior problems). Specifically, four of the five
subscales are scored in a similar way, with higher scores
indicating a greater likelihood of significant problems, whereas
the prosocial subscale provides a reverse score where higher
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scores indicate more prosocial behaviors or strengths. In this
study, we used the subscale of peer relationship problems, which
contains 5 items (i.e., “Rather solitary, tends to play alone), and
the subscale of prosocial behavior, which also has 5 items (i.e.,
“Helpful if someone is hurt, upset, or feeling ill”).
The SDQ has shown good statistical and psychometric
properties, with Cronbach’s alpha values above 0.70 (Goodman,
2001), confirmed in the Spanish population (0.76) (Rodríguez-
Hernández et al., 2012). It also obtained acceptable to high
internal consistency in the current study (Cronbach’s α = 0.74–
0.80 between subscales).
Adaptive/Social Skills
The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (VABS-II ed; Sparrow
et al., 2005) was filled out by parents to evaluate the adaptive
capacity of their children. It includes four fundamental domains:
communication, daily living skills, socialization, and motor skills.
It has another domain that extracts an index of maladaptive
behavior. For this study, the scores in two domains were
used, daily living skills and socialization skills. Daily living
skills describe personal (e.g., eating, dressing, and hygiene),
domestic (e.g., household tasks performed), and community (e.g.,
using money, answering the phone) tasks, and the socialization
scale also includes three subscales that describe interpersonal
relationships, play and leisure time, and coping skills.
The Vineland-II scale has been widely used in people with
ASD to evaluate social maturity. It has solid psychometric
properties, with high test-retest reliability (α = 0.98)
(Sparrow et al., 2005).
Pragmatic Abilities/Pragmatic Competence
The Children’s Communication Checklist (CCC-2; Bishop, 2003)
provides information about communication characteristics in
subjects from 4 to 11 years old. The frequency of the behaviors
described in each item included in the CCC-2 is rated on a
4-point scale; a high score indicates greater communication
problems. In addition, the 70 items included in the CCC-2 are
grouped in 10 subscales that measure different communicative
aspects. The first block assesses the structural aspects of language
and has four subscales (speech, syntax, semantics, and coherence).
The second block evaluates the pragmatic aspects of language
and also has four subscales (inappropriate initiation, stereotyped
language, use of context, and non-verbal communication). Finally,
the last block contains two subscales designed to evaluate the
typical features of ASD (social relationships and interests). In the
present study, we used the pragmatic composite index (PCI),
which is obtained by adding together the scores on the coherence,
inappropriate initiation, stereotyped language, use of context, and
non-verbal communication subscales. This specific grouping,
although not contemplated in the CCC-2, has been used in other
previous studies (Helland, 2014). The CCC-2, which in this study
was filled out by the parents, presents good internal consistency
that ranges between 0.66 and 0.80 (Bishop, 2003).
Severity of ASD Symptoms
The severity of ASD symptoms was assessed with the Social
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter et al., 2003),
which is based on a semi-structured parent interview used for
the diagnostic evaluation of children with suspected ASD. It
provides information about three domains of autistic symptoms:
reciprocal social interaction (i.e., “Does your son/daughter have
specific friends or a close friend?”); communication (i.e., “Can
you have a conversation with him/her that flows both ways and
requires taking turns speaking or elaborating on what was said
before?”); and restricted/repetitive behaviors (i.e., “Has s/he ever
shown more interest in the parts of a toy or object [for example,
turning the wheels on a car] than in using the toy itself?”).
The SCQ has good psychometric properties (Cronbach’s alpha of
0.84–0.93 across age groups and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81–0.92
across diagnostic groups) (Rutter et al., 2003). In this study, the
Cronbach’s alpha for the questionnaire was 0.78, which is similar
to what Rutter et al. (2003) reported.
Procedure
This research was performed in accordance with the ethical
standards of the Research Ethics Committee of the University
of Valencia, which is regulated by Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects (Declaration of Helsinki
1964, World Medical Association, 2013). Likewise, it received
authorization from the Board of Education of the Valencian
Government to access the schools and locate the participants.
The evaluation was carried out in the schools where
the children were enrolled, in specially prepared spaces that
met optimal conditions for psychoeducational assessment. The
informed oral and written consent of the parents of all the
participants was also obtained after informing them about
the research proposal. The children were evaluated during
school hours, without interfering with the basic curricular
activities. The intelligence test and the two tests from the
social perception domain were administered to all the children
individually by trained examiners. The parents (mostly mothers)
provided information about their children’s ToM skills in daily
life contexts, ASD symptoms, and adaptive/social skills. The
teachers-tutors filled out the questionnaire selected to assess EF.
Data Analyses
The statistical analyses were performed with the statistical
program for the Social Sciences [SPSS v 24.0 (SPSS)]. Preliminary
analyses checked all data for multicollinearity and multivariate
outliers. The asymmetry and kurtosis data indicate that most of
the variables followed a normal distribution (all values between
−1 and 1). Variables that did not show a normal distribution were
transformed using square-root transformation.
To examine distinct profiles (i.e., subgroups) of Theory of
Mind abilities in ASD, we performed hierarchical cluster analysis.
The input for this analysis included three variables from the
social perception domain of the NEPSY-II battery: Emotion
recognition, Verbal task of ToM, and Contextual task of ToM;
and three variables from the Theory of Mind Inventory (ToMI):
Early scale, Basic scale, and Advanced scale. Moreover, the
variables were standardized to z-scores.
We evaluated hierarchical clustering using multiple internal
validity measures. Specifically, we varied the number of clusters
from two to three, and the optimal N-cluster solution was
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determined on the basis of visual inspection of the dendrogram
figure and the agglomeration coefficients.
Additionally, we also carried out the same procedure with
non-hierarchical clustering, namely, K-means, because this
procedure allows us to specify the number of clusters in advance.
Lastly, in order to fit the optimal cluster analysis solution, we
used the variance ratio criterion (VRC) for each selected cluster.
The VRC refers to the ratio of the ‘within variance’ (variance
explained by the typology) and ‘between variance,’ corrected for
the number of clusters and responses. The two-cluster solution
seemed to be optimal in the hierarchical cluster analysis, based
on Ward’s method, and the VRC showed a lower score for two
solutions (Cohen-Addad et al., 2019).
After analyzing the resulting dendrogram and data, the
decision was made to group the children in two clusters,
controlling for vocabulary and working memory (ANCOVAs).
We labeled each of the ASD subgroups based on the patterns of
functioning across domains of ToM abilities. Then we checked
the possible differences between the Clusters obtained and a
control group with TD.
Finally, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were
conducted to determine the differences between the children
in the cluster groups on the following measures: the Strengths
and Difficulties Questionnaire- SDQ (Peers problems and
Prosocial scale); the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales-
VABS-II (Daily life skills and Socialization domains); the
Children’s Communication Checklist -CCC-2 (Pragmatic Index);
and the Social Communication Questionnaire-SCQ (Social,
Communication, and Stereotyped behavior scales). For the
ANOVAs, the level of significance was set at p < 0.004,
after applying the Bonferroni correction. The proportion of
total variance accounted for by the independent variables was
calculated using partial eta squared [according to Cohen (1988):
eta squared, 0.06 = small; 0.06–0.14 = medium, 0.14 = large].
RESULTS
Profiles of Children With ASD Without
Intellectual Disability (ID) Comparison of
Profiles With Children With Typical
Development (TD)
The first goal of the analysis was to examine whether children
with ASD were more likely to cluster into a single group or
multiple groups on the basis of measures of ToM skills.
Results from the hierarchical cluster analysis with the
children’s ToM abilities determined an optimal number of
clusters in two groupings, distinguished by the tendency of their
scores on the variables included in the analysis: TOM explicit
knowledge (emotion recognition, verbal, and contextual ToM)
and applied knowledge (Early, Basic, and Advanced ToMI).
Cluster 1 (n = 22; 42.30%) presented higher scores on all the
variables of theory of mind skills, on both applied ToM abilities
and explicit ToM abilities. By contrast, Cluster 2 (n = 30;
57.69%) showed lower scores than Cluster 1 on all the ToM
skills measured.
Analyses of covariance, controlling for vocabulary and
working memory (ANCOVAs), were then conducted to
determine the significant differences between the two clusters in
the theory of mind skills considered. After applying Bonferroni
correction, children classified in Cluster 1 obtained scores
that were statistically different from Cluster 2 on most of the
measured variables, with the comparisons showing moderate to
large effect sizes on Verbal ToM and Early, Basic, and Advanced
ToMI: Verbal-ToM, F1,50 = 50.39, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.50; 001;
Early-ToMI, F1,50 = 19.25, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28; Basic-ToMI,
F1,50 = 44.11, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.47; Advanced-ToMI, F1,50 = 9.99,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16. The differences between the two groups did
not reach statistical significance after applying the Bonferroni
correction on the effect sizes for Emotion Recognition (η2p = 0.09)
and the contextual ToM task (η 2p = 0.11).
Based on the described patterns of functioning across domains
of ToM abilities, Cluster 1 was labeled “Higher ToM skills,” and
Cluster 2 was called the “Lower ToM skills” group (see Table 1
and Figure 1).
Additionally, the results of the Bartlett sphericity test
indicate that the variables were sufficiently intercorrelated
[χ2(15) = 78.25; p < 0.001], which is an important requirement
for subsequent multivariate analysis.
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was conducted
to analyze differences between Cluster 1 “Higher ToM abilities,”
Cluster 2 “Lower ToM abilities,” and the TD group on the
Emotion recognition and social perception subscales of the
NEPSY-II (explicit ToM knowledge) and the ToMI inventory
scales (applied knowledge). The MANOVA conducted to assess
the main group effect among the three groups was statistically
significant [Wilk‘s Lambda (3) = 0.07, F(12,162) = 37.23,
p < 0.001, η2p= 0.73]. ANOVAs showed significant differences
on the NEPSY subscales: Emotion recognition, F2,86 = 22.46,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.34; Verbal-ToM, F2,86 = 52.81, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.55; Contextual-ToM, F2,86 = 9.43, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.18. Statistically significant differences were also found
on the applied ToM tasks (ToMI): Early-ToMI, F2,86 = 54.36,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.55; Basic-ToMI, F2,86 = 132.51, p < 0.001,
TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations (SD) of TOM skills for the two clusters
obtained, and statistically significant differences between the two clusters (Higher
TOM skills and Lower TOM skills).
Measure Cluster 1
Higher TOM




skills (n = 30)
M (SD)
F(1,50) p η2p
Emotion Re 25.18 (3.14) 22.70 (4.43) 5.02 0.029 0.09
Verbal TOM 17.00 (2.74) 11.83 (2.47) 50.39 0.000* 0.50
Contextual TOM 4.54 (0.80) 3.51 (1.85) 5.95 0.018 0.11
Early ToMI 16.58 (3.19) 13.00 (2.67) 19.25 0.000* 0.28
Basic ToMI 15.57 (2.24) 10.98 (2.60) 44.11 0.000* 0.47
Advanced ToMI 9.43 (2.84) 6.99 (2.73) 9.79 0.003* 0.16
Emotion Re, emotion recognition; Verbal TOM, theory of mind-Verbal; Contextual
TOM, theory of mind- contextual; ToMI, theory of mind inventory. *p < 0.008
(Bonferroni correction).
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplot of pairwise comparisons between clusters on each TOM subscale.
η2p = 0.75; Advanced-ToMI, F2,86 = 139.89, p < 0.001,
η 2p = 0.76.
Bonferroni post hoc analyses showed statistically significant
differences on the Verbal TOM task between Cluster 2 “Lower
ToM abilities” and both Cluster 1 “Higher ToM abilities” and
the TD group, whereas there were no significant differences
between Cluster 1 “Higher ToM abilities” and the TD group.
A similar pattern was observed on the Contextual ToM task,
where there were no significant differences between Cluster 1
(“Higher ToM abilities”) and the TD group, but there were
statistically significant differences between Cluster 2 “Lower ToM
abilities” and both Cluster 1 “Higher ToM abilities” and the
TD group. Finally, there were statistically significant differences
between the TD group and both Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 on
Early-ToMI, Basic-ToMI, and Advanced-ToMI (p < 0.001), with
significant differences between the two Clusters of ASD children
(“Higher” and “Lower ToM abilities”). Consequently, Cluster
1, in the comparison with the TD group, showed a profile of
generalized deficits affecting both explicit and applied ToM skills.
In contrast, the deficit of Cluster 2, in comparison with the TD
group, was found in the application of ToM skills.
Figure 2 shows the comparisons of the mean scores of the two
ASD clusters and the TD group.
Differences in Severity of Symptoms,
Social-Adaptive Behavior, and Pragmatic
Abilities Across the Profiles of Children
With ASD
Table 2 presents the comparison of two Clusters of ASD, ‘Lower
ToM abilities” and ‘Higher ToM abilities,” on social-adaptive
behavior, pragmatic abilities, and severity of symptoms. The
analysis of variance revealed statistically significant differences
between the two clusters in Daily life skills (VABS) F1,50 = 11.07,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.18; Social domain (VABS) F1,50 = 15.27,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23; Pragmatic index (CCC) F1,50 = 16.48,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25; the Social symptoms domain (SCQ)
F1,50 = 9.97, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.17; and the Communication
symptoms domain (SCQ) F1,50 = 14.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.323.
After applying the Bonferroni correction (p < 0.004), the
variables that remained significant were the same: Daily life
skills (VABS), Socialization skills (VABS), Pragmatic index
(CCC), Social symptoms domain (SCQ), and Communication
symptoms domain (SCQ).
DISCUSSION
A critical target in ASD research is to identify homogenous
subgroups to better understand neurodevelopmental patterns
and design meaningful intervention strategies. In the past decade,
several studies have used the methodological resource of cluster
analysis to empirically derive ASD subtypes that share common
cognitive and behavioral characteristics (Baeza-Velasco et al.,
2014; Campbell et al., 2014; Hoogenhout and Malcolm-Smith,
2017). Following this approach, the first aim of the present
study was to identify profiles of children with ASD without
ID, based on measures of explicit and applied ToM knowledge.
The cluster analysis carried out using different ToM measures
made it possible to identify two profiles of children with ASD.
One group, made up of 42.30% of the participants, showed
better performance than the other group on all the variables of
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FIGURE 2 | Means of Clusters 1, 2, and the typically developing group (TD) on the TOM children’s variables.
TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations (SD) of social, adaptive behavior, and autism severity for the two clusters obtained (Higher TOM skills and Lower TOM skills), and
statistically significant differences between them.
Cluster 1 Higher TOM skills (n = 22) Cluster 2 Lower TOM skills (n = 30)
Measures M SD M SD F(1,50) p η2p
SDQ_Peers 5.77 2.09 5.77 2.19 0.00 0.992 0.00
SDQ_Prosocial 6.46 2.69 5.23 1.94 3.63 0.061 0.07
VABS_Daily L 82.77 9.18 74.37 8.86 11.07 0.002* 0.18
VABS_Social 81.00 10.0 71.43 7.58 15.27 0.000* 0.23
CCC_Pragmatic I 23.77 8.62 15.20 6.61 16.48 0.000* 0.25
SCQ_Social 7.86 3.31 11.03 3.77 9.97 0.003* 0.17
SCQ_Communica 6.20 2.35 8.47 1.93 14.61 0.000* 0.23
SCQ_Stereotyp 4.65 2.06 4.93 1.93 0.25 0.617 0.01
SDQ Peers, strengths and difficulties questionnaire peers problems scale; VABS_Daily L, vineland adaptive behavior scales_daily life skills; CCC_Pragmatic I,
children’s communication checklist_pragmatic index; SCQ_Communica, social communication questionnaire_communication; SCQ_Stereotyp, stereotyped behavior
scale. ∗p < 0.004 (Bonferroni correction).
ToM abilities, and so it was labeled the “Higher ToM abilities”
group. The other group had the lowest ToM performance and
consisted of 57.69% of the children with ASD, and so it was
called the “Lower ToM abilities” group. Moreover, both clusters
differed significantly on the explicit verbal ToM task and on three
levels of applied ToM abilities, early, basic, and advanced. These
differences persisted even after controlling variables that have
been shown to play an essential role in ToM development in
children with ASD, such as the language level (Steele et al., 2003)
or working memory (Kouklari et al., 2019).
Additional important information stemmed from comparing
the two ASD groups and the TD group on ToM skills. This
analysis helped to determine the specific types of deficits in
children with ASD. Thus, applied ToM skills distinguished
between the children with ASD and their typically developing
peers. Statistically significant differences between the TD group
and the two groups of children with ASD, both those in the
“Lower” group and those with “Higher ToM abilities,” were
found on all three ToMI subscales (Early, Basic, and Advanced).
Therefore, parents perceived that the two groups with ASD
had more difficulties than the TD group in understanding
basic emotions, distinguishing between the physical and mental,
making second-order inferences, or making complex social
judgments. In addition, the group with ASD and “Lower
ToM abilities” showed worse competence than the TD group
on understanding first- and second-order false beliefs, double
deception, and figurative language, all of which are assessed
on the ToM verbal subtest. This group with ASD and “Lower
ToM abilities” also presented difficulties on the contextual task,
obtaining significantly worse results than the ASD group with
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“Higher ToM abilities.” By contrast, on the two measures that
assess the explicit component of ToM, the verbal and contextual
tasks on the NEPSY, the ASD group with “Higher ToM abilities”
had similar performance to the TD group.
Clearly, two profiles of children with ASD without ID have
been differentiated, namely “Higher” and “Lower” ToM abilities,
based on explicit and applied ToM knowledge. However, the
effect sizes (see Table 1) show the greater weight of the verbal
task (understanding the other’s point of view) and the Basic ToMI
subscale (understanding mental terms of feelings and actions)
in differentiating the two groups. Furthermore, when comparing
the two ASD groups and the TD group, the verbal task also
discriminates the ASD group with worse ToM skills from the
other two groups.
In sum, of the two Clusters of children with ASD, Cluster 2
(“Lower ToM abilities”) showed generalized explicit and applied
ToM impairments, whereas the impairment of Cluster 1 (“Higher
ToM abilities”) was more specific. In general, children in the latter
group performed well on explicit ToM tasks where they had time
to process the information and were given clear instructions and
even options to select the correct answer (Barendse et al., 2018).
Their failures focused on effectively applying the conceptual
knowledge to real life interactions, which could be due, at least
in part, to difficulties in developing appropriate strategies in an
often unpredictable and changing context. Therefore, the initial
hypothesis was fulfilled: the profiles identified in children with
ASD differed in the level of development of different ToM skills
and the application of the skills to daily life, which, even in the
best performing profile, showed a weaker development than in
the group with TD.
A second aim of the study was to examine whether the
identified clusters could be differentiated by testing external
variables such as symptom severity, social/adaptive behavior, and
pragmatic abilities. As expected, the profile that had the greatest
problems with ToM abilities showed greater ASD symptom
severity and worse socio-adaptive and pragmatic skills. In fact,
the group with “Lower ToM abilities” was characterized by
more severe ASD symptoms and poorer pragmatic skills, in
terms of inappropriate communicative beginnings and deficits
in coherence and interpretation of language depending on
the context, among other indicators. This group also showed
significantly less mastery of daily living skills and poorer adaptive
skills than the “Higher ToM abilities” profile, which showed
less widespread impairment. Our results corroborate previous
findings that have linked the prevalence of ToM in ASD to the
degree of autistic symptoms (Lerner et al., 2011; Hoogenhout and
Malcolm-Smith, 2017) or to pragmatic and social competence
(Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Mazza et al., 2017; Baixauli et al., 2019).
On measures of Peer problems and Prosocial behavior,
the means of both the Cluster with “Lower ToM abilities”
and the Cluster with “Higher ToM abilities” are in the
borderline/abnormal range. These impairments include
behaviors such as inappropriate affect, social isolation, and
failure to initiate interactions with peers, cooperate, share,
make friends, express empathy, or provide emotional support.
However, the two Clusters of children with ASD without ID
were not significantly differentiated by the behaviors rated on
these two scales. Thus, our results suggest that the difficulties of
children with ASD-ID with prosocial behavior or relations with
peers cannot be explained solely by differences in ToM ability.
Previous studies concluded that, although performance on ToM
tasks is associated with different subtypes of prosocial behavior
(helping, cooperating, and comforting), the magnitude of the
association is relatively weak (Imuta et al., 2016). Moreover, no
ToM types have predicted parent reported social functioning
of their children with ASD (Altschuler et al., 2018), and no
simple or direct relationship has been found between behavioral
indices of ToM ability and everyday social interactions, as in
friendships described by children with high-functioning ASD
(Calder et al., 2013).
Limitations and Future Directions
This research has some limitations that should be considered,
and so the findings should be interpreted with caution. On
the one hand, the implicit component of the ToM was not
evaluated, which would have allowed a more complete profile
of the mind-reading skills of the participants to be outlined.
We are aware that the best information collection strategy
would have been to involve different sources by using a variety
of assessment measures (multi-method assessment). However,
parents of children with ASD are a reliable source of information
about their children’s ToM because they have the opportunity
to observe them during real world social interactions (Hutchins
et al., 2011; Lerner et al., 2011). Even more, the ToM Inventory
filled out by parents in our study has shown to provide a
broad view the child’s theory of mind abilities, which can
help to identify different profiles and potential targets within
and across domains (early, basic, and advanced) (Greenslade
and Coggins, 2016). Moreover, observational measures of
pragmatic and social competence were not used either, as
they were only assessed through parental estimates. Given the
dependence and contextual variability characterizing these skills,
it would have been desirable to have information from other
informants (teachers, for example) in other significant settings in
the child’s life.
Similarly, the small sample size and the predominance of
males are two aspects that restrict the generalization of the
results to the population of girls with ASD. It is possible that,
in general, girls show a better profile. In fact, whereas social
impairments and mentalizing language are linked in boys with
ASD, this link seems to be weaker in girls (Boorse et al., 2019).
Therefore, studies with larger samples that include girls with
ASD are needed in order to find out how ToM deficits are
manifested in this population. Moreover, ToM is a dynamic
construct influenced by individual experiences, for what it should
also be analyzed the specific role of contextual factors that
have an impact on the developmental trajectories of explicit
and applied ToM skills: maternal mind-mindedness (Laranjo
et al., 2010), quality of relationships with siblings (Prime et al.,
2016), or peer interactions (Slaughter et al., 2015). Longitudinal
studies may also be an avenue for future research that can
provide a more complete and dynamic understanding of the
interaction between ToM and other indicators of the functioning
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of people with ASD, for example, in terms of predictors and
social outcomes.
Implications
The findings of the present study raise several clinical
considerations regarding the diagnosis and assessment of autism
spectrum disorders. First, this study confirms that children
with ASD without ID vary in their development of ToM
abilities. It is reinforced the idea that ToM is a multifaceted
range of skills that are not always impaired to the same
grade in children wit ASD. One group of children could show
a more severe profile, characterized by deficits in cognitive
understanding of other people’s mental states and in applied
behavioral aspects of ToM skills, whereas the impairments
in the other group could be related to their competence in
applying ToM skills. In any case, even the subgroup with
better ToM abilities, whose performance on explicit ToM
is equal to that of TD, does not seem to successfully deal
with social interactions in daily life. In these situations, it
is necessary to respond spontaneously to a variety of events,
which requires more resources than when performing tasks in
contexts with greater stimulus control. Hence, it is important
to complement the assessment using ToM performance tasks
with procedures that evaluate how children cope with real-
world social interactions and capture different levels, that is,
early, basic, and advanced ToM. In conclusion, we think the
data provided in this study are valuable because they emphasize
the usefulness of incorporating applied and observational
measures of ToM abilities into diagnostic processes in ASD
clinical practice.
Second, this research provides information about the dynamic
relationship of ToM with other important social functioning
domains, as suggested by neuro-constructivist approaches
(Bennett et al., 2013). The ASD group with “Higher ToM
abilities” presents better adaptive skills related to daily life
and socialization, such as money management and pragmatic
skills, and less ASD symptomatology. However, both groups
(Lower and Higher ToM) continue to show problems with
peers and deficits in prosocial behavior, suggesting that deficits
in social awareness are not the only explanation for social
behavior problems. Other factors such as low social motivation
or lack of opportunities for interaction or specific interference
responses (i.e., reduction in social behaviors) may be involved.
In this regard, a comprehensive assessment will help to
clarify whether social problems are due to a lack of social
cognition or social performance or both, in order to tailor
interventions accordingly.
Together, the profiles identified suggest that ToM is
appropriately conceptualized as a continuum of skills as
well as an ASD severity indicator of individual differences
in social outcomes. Therefore, information about ToM
profiles has both clinical and practical importance in the
evaluation and design of interventions that fit the profiles
of difficulties and potential of people with ASD. On the one
hand, it evidences the need to use batteries that include
a wide range of measures and task demands in order to
capture individual differences. The objective will be to
identify the map of lower mind skills, as well as more
advanced abilities, in children with ASD. On the other
hand, closely related to the above, ToM profiles highlight
the need to design specific treatment targets that fit an
individual’s particular profile in a highly complex domain.
Even though each child with ASD may have a different
social functioning level, active participation in mentalization
tasks related to understanding the mental states of others
may improve his/her social awareness. Improvements in
the conceptual understanding of ToM, however, are not
sustained or generalized to real-life social settings and
interactions (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014). Consequently,
as Bennett et al. (2013) highlighted, social cognition-
based interventions should be developmentally sensitive
and ecologically valid, incorporating naturalistic settings
and engaging parents, teachers, and peers as facilitators
(Kasari et al., 2010). Although ToM can impact social
skills, social experiences themselves, especially support
from peer relationships, can provide richer opportunities
for everyday social interaction in school-aged children with ASD
(Rodda and Estes, 2018).
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